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SHOULD WORKERS BE COMPELLED TO
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GEORGE H. TRAFTON*
In the country-wide movement for unemployment compensation or insurance-
now given added impetus in the Federal Social Security Act-one of the principal
controversial issues is whether or not the wage-earner should be required to make
contributions to the reserve funds from which unemployment benefits are to be paid.
With ten unemployment compensation laws already enacted, this important question
of social policy has yet to receive a decisive legislative answer.1
Five states-Massachusetts and New Hampshire in New England, Alabama in
the South, and California and Washington on the West Coast-have adopted systems
that compel the worker to contribute. On the other hand, New York, with the largest
industrial population of any state; Congress, acting for the District of Columbia;
Wisconsin, in its pioneer American unemployment compensation law; and Oregon
and Utah, representing the West, have enacted measures which require no employee
contributions. Within the next few months, other states will find it necessary to
choose which of these examples they will follow-with far-reaching consequences to
their wage-earners and to social insurance in America.
In enacting America's first unemployment compensation law in 1932, after ten
years of consideration by its legislature, the progressive State of Wisconsin adopted
the principle that the cost of unemployment compensation, like the cost of workmen's
accident compensation, should be made an expense of doing business, with employers
alone contributing. At the same time, through the device of establishment accounts
in the reserve fund, employers were afforded the greatest possible opportunity to
reduce, or even eliminate, this cost through efficient management in providing steady
work. This plan has been recognized as a distinctively American approach to
unemployment insurance.
The basic provisions of the Wisconsin act were immediately and vigorously
attacked, not only by conservative employers who sought to prevent the adoption of
such legislation by other states, but also by certain proponents of social insurance
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who favor the British scheme of three-way contributions-from employers, 'workers,
and the state. Because fiscal difficulties have made the placing of additional burdens
on the taxpayer appear politically impossible, most of these advocates have been
willing as a practical matter to abandon the principle of state contributions; but
many of them have continued to insist that wage-earners be compelled to contribute.2
Compulsory worker contributions have been insisted upon by many employers
because they believe such a scheme will reduce the cost to themselves. The idea of
worker contributions also appeals to the popular view that those who will benefit
should be willing to pay at least part of the cost. Then too, it is thought by many
that contributing to the unemployment reserve funds will maintain the workers'
self-respect and remove the taint of "the dole." These views have been so widely
expressed that, for a time, proponents of unemployment insurance who favored
compulsory worker contributions argued that bills not requiring such contributions
had little or no chance of enactment-outside of Wisconsin! This, events have since
disproved.
A somewhat more refined argument sets forth the theory that workers who are
required to contribute to the insurance funds will as a result take a strong interest
in safeguarding these reserves against the malingering of fellow-workers. It is further
contended that employees, by contributing, will gain the right to participate in
administering the funds. The additional suggestion is made that if, as some
theoretical economists have warned, the worker will in any event pay part or all of
the cost of benefits through higher prices and lower wages, he might as well con-
tribute directly and get the credit for doing so. Some advocates, however, have
asserted that the really basic reason for worker contributions is that they are necessary
in order to provide sufficient funds for adequate benefits.
Evidently, the controversy over compulsory worker contributions in unemploy-
ment compensation revolves around three basic issues: (i) The demands of justice
in the distribution of the cost of unemployment benefits; (2) the effect of contribu-
tions upon employers and employees in their relation to the system; and (3) the
question of adequate benefits.
Those who urge that it is only just to require wage-earners to pay part of the
cost of unemployment benefits tend to overlook the fact that even under unemploy-
ment insurance, workers will continue to bear the major share of the burden of
unemployment. Before benefits begin, the unemployed wage-earner must meet the
entire cost for a waiting period usually of three weeks, but in some laws four or even
six. Even when benefits are paid, they will amount to only a fraction of full wages,
as a rule not more than 50 per cent; and they are further restricted by a maximum,
usually $15. These benefits, moreover, will continue for not more than a limited
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number of weeks, in most instances sixteen, after which the entire cost will again
fall upon the worker. Under a system of compensation which leaves te worker to
sustain so large a share of the cost of unemployment, it is difficult to understand
why on grounds of justice industry should not be required to pay the entire cost of
unemployment benefits.
There is weight in the views of organized labor in this connection, as expressed
by William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor:3
"Labor is not responsible for unemployment. Workers are not in a position to control
the causes of unemployment. That is a function of management. Unemployment com-
pensation is a recognition of this fact. Simple justice demands that workers shall not be
forced out of their inadequate earnings to pay for management's failure to stabilize em-
ployment. . . .Under our accident compensation laws we have rightly agreed that the
worker should not have to contribute to the fund from which cash benefits are paid. As
a cost of production, the insurance premium very properly is figured by the employer as
a part of his over-head expense and is ultimately passed on to the consumer. The same
arguments apply with special force against compelling the worker to contribute under
unemployment compensation or insurance.
"Those who would force workers to contribute to unemployment insurance ignore the
fact that while the employer is in a position to pass his contribution on to the consumer,
workers can not do so. The worker therefore would bear the entire burden of such a levy;
but the employer would escape. To argue that under a scheme of forced worker contribu-
tions workers will 'share' the cost with employers is to be guilty of deception. The worker
would have to take his contribution out of his standard of living, but the employer can
recoup his 'share' by slightly increasing the price of his product."
Proponents of employee contributions, especially those who continue to favor a
state contribution, have sometimes involved themselves in strange inconsistencies
when discussing the tendency of employer contributions to be reflected in the price
of commodities. They argue that this will mean that workers will after all pay the
employers' contribution; that it will in effect be a kind of "sales tax." If it appears
unjust for workers to help pay for unemployment benefits through higher prices,
the question is raised why these same advocates of three-way contributions so strongly
favor making the wage-earner pay twice-by a deduction from wages as well as in
higher prices. Labor has made its own position clear on this point. The stand taken
by the American Federation of Labor since 1932 is that "the whole should be paid by
management as a cost of production."
The theory that worker contributions will tend to give wage-earners a more de-
sirable attitude toward the unemployment compensation system is subject to proof
only by the test of experience. It is probably significant that nothing in American
experience under workmen's accident compensation justifies the belief that a social
insurance system requiring no worker contribution will be taken as a dole by its
beneficiaries. If available evidence proves anything, it is that legislation creating a
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legal right to fixed cash payments lacks the essential element of "the dole," the grant
of which is determined by a needs test; and that this difference is readily appreciated
by the recipients, whether they be wage-earners, old folks, or war veterans.
The right of labor to an active interest in the provisions and administration of
workmen's compensation legislation has not been seriously questioned, and the rep-
resentatives of labor have never hesitated to assert that right. The fact that workers
are not required to contribute apparently has cast not the least shadow of a doubt
over the propriety of labor's making its voice heard in a legislative program so vitally
affecting its welfare. That this same right should be in any way compromised by
failure to contribute to an unemployment compensation system is hard to imagine.
That it is not endangered in practice has already been demonstrated during the four
years of experience with such legislation in Wisconsin, as well as under the New
York and other more recent laws.
The belief that a compulsory contribution will increase the worker's concern for
the protection of the reserve funds has also been challenged. The contributory sys-
tem in England did not prevent British labor from asking for and obtaining an
extension of benefits to unemployed workers who had not "earned" them. It is
probable that the desired attitude on the part of labor may be assured, not by com-
pelling workers to contribute, but by making it perfectly evident that the funds
available for benefits are definitely limited in amount. If the workers understand
that it is possible for the fund to be exhausted, they may be expected to protect its
solvency regardless of whether or not they are required to contribute. This is the
view expressed by a member of the Wisconsin Manufacturers' Association who has
made a careful study of unemployment compensation. He adds: 4
"Experience has shown that there is never any difficulty in getting employees to under-
stand that a fund contributed by their employers at a fixed percentage of payroll will not
be able to stand unlimited drains, and that it is not fair to expect it to do so. But if the
state contributes, there can be no acceptable excuse for shortages, and no amount of logical
explanation can convince an employee that a fund to which he has been required, or even
permitted, to contribute can with any justice be allowed to become inadequate to pay him
full benefits in case he becomes unemployed."
British experience has been said to indicate a tendency on the part of workers
to take the attitude that the mere fact that they have contributed to the insurance
fund gives them a right to benefits and they therefore are inclined to get benefits if
they can.
The statement that compulsory worker contributions are necessary in order to
provide adequate benefits involves a judgment as to what is "adequate" and also as
to the amount that employers may be required to contribute. When this argument
was first advanced in the early stages of the campaign for unemployment compen-
sation, bills requiring only employers to contribute fixed a 2 per cent contribution
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rate. Advocates of employee contributions at that time urged that for the sake of
adequacy the total should be made 3 per cent by compelliig the workers to con-
tribute an additional i per cent of wages. Subsequently, when legislation was intro-
duced, and in some states enacted, requiring a 3 per cent contribution from em-
ployers alone-and with federal legislation enacted also levying a 3 per cent tax on
employers-some of these advocates nevertheless continued their demand for worker
contributions on the ground that no matter what the employers' contribution might
be, an additional amount taken from the workers' pay-envelope would make the
funds available for benefits "more adequate"! Opponents of employee contributions
point out that a 4 or even 5 per cent contribution could be levied on employers
without serious consequences, provided this rate was made uniform as between
employers in competing states.
Under workmen's compensation legislation, America's first great step in social
insurance, the principle is now firmly established that the cost of benefits for occupa-
tional injuries should be made a charge on industry and thus enter into the cost
of production. It has been generally recognized that this feature of workmen's com-
pensation has had a remarkably stimulating effect upon preventive effort by em-
ployers. In approaching the problem of unemployment-the only purely industrial
hazard-there appears to be sound reason for applying the same principle. So long
as the profit-motive continues to be the chief driving force in economic life, it will
continue to be wise social policy wherever possible by such devices to harness this
motive in the interest of the general welfare. A careful weighing of the arguments
for and against compulsory worker contributions appear to tip the scales, both of
justice and of expediency, in favor of making the entire direct cost of unemployment
compensation an expense of doing business.
